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INTRODUCTION
Simultaneously with the decrease in the budget deficit,
Hungary’s external balance indicators also improved
significantly in 2007. At the same time, the net non-debt-
creating capital inflow reduced drastically compared to
previous years, which – despite the moderating external
imbalance – resulted in a marked rise in external
indebtedness. In an economic environment of decreasing
risk tolerance as a result of the sub-prime crisis, the
spectacular rise in debt-creating financing has shifted the
attention of analysts and investors to the structure of
external financing.
Many saw a correlation between the fall in non-debt-creating
financing and Hungary’s poorer prospects for long-term
growth and deteriorating competitiveness. Nevertheless, the
processes deserve a more elaborate approach in many
respects. Public thinking, for example, has a considerably
unilateral view of the advantages of foreign direct
investment, while we tend to interpret the rising role of debt-
creating financing a sign of shattered investor confidence.
Analyses only examining net capital flows also tend to
oversimplify the question as they do not pay attention to the
potentially different motivations behind the funds entering
and leaving the country. Another important factor to be
considered is that the structure of external financing can only
be evaluated in conjunction with the given level of external
imbalance and the level of development of the economy and
the country’s institutions.
The first part of the study presents a brief overview of the
conceptual framework within which external imbalance and
the structure of external financing can be analysed. We look
at the stylised facts in Hungary, and also examine the
development of FDI flows in a regional comparison. This is
followed by an attempt to put the structure of external
financing into a wider framework with the help of theoretical
and empirical findings in the relevant literature. Finally, an
evaluation will be given of the recently accelerated
restructuring of Hungary’s external financing with some
forward-looking conclusions as well.
EXTERNAL FINANCING REQUIREMENT
AND THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCING
1
The financial savings of a country, i.e. the part of its gross
national disposable income (GNDI),
2 which is not spent on
consumption (C) or on capital formation (I), is known as the
net external financing capacity (NFK). If we take into
account that capital formation can be realised not only from
disposable income, but also from net unilateral capital
transfers in the capital account (KA) of the balance of
payments, then we can demonstrate that the external
Hungary’s external balance indicators improved a great deal in 2007. Simultaneously, however, the external debt ratio also
rose which, in an international climate of uncertainty stemming from the sub-prime crisis, drew investors’ attention to the
structure of the country’s external financing. This study argues that the recent increase in debt-creating external financing does
not necessarily increase risks associated with sustainability. On the one hand, the record rise in debt-creating financing in 2007
is largely due to one-off items. On the other hand, the waning significance of non-debt-creating financing is not attributable to
declining inflows but rather mostly to residents’ stepped up capital exports, which is partly a result of the development in the
institutional investor sector, and partly of the foreign expansion of a few large resident companies. The picture becomes even
more intricate as according to recent research, the advantages generally associated with non-debt-creating financing are not
always supported by findings, and empirical experience indicates that more developed countries are often characterised by a
higher share of debt-type external liabilities. Naturally, and irrespectively of the structure of financing, Hungary’s high level of
net foreign liabilities in an international comparison continues to be a strong risk factor.
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1 A detailed elaboration on the contents of this chapter can be found in Antal (2006).
2 Gross national disposable income (GNDI) is the sum of gross domestic product (GDP), the net foreign income (NFI) and the balance of current transfers (NFTC).MNB BULLETIN • APRIL 2008 15
financing capacity equals the sum of the current account (CA)
and the capital account balance:
When a country spends more than its income – as is the case
in Hungary – then its net external financing capacity is
negative, which is also called the external financing
requirement.
3 The financial transactions between foreigners
and domestic agents, i.e. the financing of the country’s
external financing requirement, are shown in the financial
account of the balance of payments. Here, we can monitor
the asset-type breakdown in which domestic sectors attracted
external resources.
Foreign resources can be classified according to whether they
embody debt-type (debt-creating) or ownership-type (non-
debt-creating) liabilities. Debt-creating funding generates
principal or interest payment obligation to the foreign
funder, whereas via non-debt-creating financing foreign
actors acquire domestic property and are hence entitled to
the income generated by the property.
4 A further
consideration for categorisation may be to see if the
investment manifests itself in a financial instrument easily
negotiable on the organised markets (so-called portfolio
investment) or represents a less ‘impersonal’ and less easily
transferable legal relationship (Table 1).
The net external financing requirement is covered by the
domestic sectors’ foreign borrowing, therefore it is expedient
to examine the typical types of external resources which the
domestic sectors rely on. The corporate sector may absorb
both debt-creating and non-debt-creating foreign funds.
Non-debt-creating capital inflow may take the form of
foreign direct investment
5 or portfolio equity investment.
6
The general government primarily relies on debt-creating
resources from abroad, but the government’s privatisation
revenues are not-debt-creating funds. Generally households
do not borrow directly from abroad, but this sector –
similarly to enterprises – may still rely on debt-creating
resources through credit institutions which merely act in such
transactions as mediators.
7
The mere fact that a country partly relies on external
resources is not a problem itself. It is only natural that fast-
growing, converging economies raise foreign capital to
finance their abundant investment opportunities. However, a
constantly high level of financing requirement is generally
considered by investors as a risk factor which reduces a
country’s resistance to external shocks, and may also be
indicative of the long-term unsustainability of economic
processes. For this reason the development of the external
financing requirement is monitored by economic policy
makers, credit rating agencies, market analysts and investors,
who use this information to formulate their opinions on the
level of risk associated with the given country.
In respect of assessing sustainability, the level of external
financing requirement is the primary factor; however in case
of a significant external imbalance, the structure of financing
may also come to the fore. Analysts generally tend to
consider one set of resources more favourable from the
recipient country’s point of view, and find other forms of
capital flows less healthy as they may increase the country’s
vulnerability. FDI is usually considered especially ‘good’ in
this respect as it is thought to stimulate growth in the
recipient country through various channels. On the other
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3This study primarily deals with processes in Hungary, and therefore the statements made herein are valid in an environment of negative external financing capacity
(external financing requirement).
4 In contrast with the standard structure of the balance of payments, this analysis places no particular importance on international reserves, which is treated as an item
reducing debt-type liabilities.
5 Consistent with the practice adopted in the Balance of Payments Statistics, parent company loans are also taken into account as part of FDI, because according to
experience, the crossover between parent company loans and equity FDI is relatively easy and may take place without any fundamental reason and without any
impact on market processes.
6The separation of FDI and portfolio-type equity investment is very difficult empirically. Macrostatistics apply a very simple rule: any stake in foreign ownership
exceeding 10 per cent is construed as FDI.
7 A good example is the increasing corporate and household FX lending of recent years, which greatly contributed to the rise in the absorption of foreign funds by the
banking system.
Debt-creating Non-debt-creating
Portfolio type bonds, money market instruments shares
Non-portfolio type loans, bank deposits, currency foreign direct investment (FDI)
Table 1
Groups of external resourcesvolatile, and think that they may exaggerate swings in the
business cycles, and may lead to or at least intensify financial
crises.
THE STRUCTURE OF EXTERNAL
FINANCING IN HUNGARY: STYLISED
FACTS
Hungary’s external financing requirement compared to GDP
increased remarkably towards the end of the 1990s and
fluctuated quite a bit until 2006 in the extremely high band
of 6 to 8 per cent. In addition to the steadily high level of
external imbalance, there was also a marked shift in the
structure of financing, i.e. the ratio between debt-creating
and non-debt-creating resources changed (Chart 1).
8
The period lasting to the early 2000s was characterised by
high non-debt-creating capital inflow and broadly
insignificant outflow: hence, the net volume of non-debt-
creating financing always tended to exceed the external
financing requirement. Early, quick privatisation played a
direct role in the strong FDI and portfolio share inflow in the
1990s, and the general scarcity of capital and the economic
policies that were designed to encourage investment by
granting significant allowances made Hungary an attractive
investment destination (Sass, 2003). Meanwhile, the direct
capital export of resident companies was insignificant, and
the level of foreign equity investment was suppressed by the
underdevelopment of the institutional investor sector
(investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies).
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
FDI inflow
Czech Republic 4.6 2.3 2.3 6.0 10.6 8.8 9.1 11.4 2.3 4.5 9.3 4.2 5.3
Poland n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 5.6 3.0 2.1 2.1 5.1 3.4 5.6 4.2
Romania n. a. n. a. n. a. 4.7 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.5 3.1 8.5 6.6 9.3 6.0
Slovakia 1.2 1.7 0.8 2.5 1.6 10.1 7.0 16.1 1.8 2.7 4.4 7.4 3.9
Hungary 11.0 7.3 9.1 7.1 6.9 5.8 7.4 4.5 2.5 4.4 6.9 6.0 4.0**
FDI outflow
Czech Republic 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.8
Poland n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.1 2.6 0.8
Romania n. a. n. a. n. a. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0
Slovakia 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 -1.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.3 0.7 0.3
Hungary 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.3 0.7 0.4 2.0 1.1 2.0 3.3 3.0
Table 2
Development of FDI flows in neighbouring countries (as a percentage of GDP)*
Source: Eurostat, MNB. 
* Including parent company loans. 
** The one-off Budapest Airport transaction reduced the FDI-to-GDP ratio by 1 to 2 percentage points.
Chart 1
Structure of external financing in Hungary, 
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8The balance of payments – similarly to all macroeconomic statistics – contains a certain degree of statistical uncertainty. This is demonstrated by the fact that the
official net financing requirement (the sum of the current and the capital account) and the financial account that covers the former do not match numerically. The
difference is shown on the line ‘Net errors and omissions’. This difference in Hungary is extremely high, but the scope of this study does not allow us to dwell on the
reasons.In recent years, however, the rising non-debt-creating capital
export of domestic agents has evolved as a new trend, which
has gone hand in hand with an increase in the ratio of debt-
creating financing. While there is no substantial decrease in
the inflow of FDI (excluding privatisation revenues), the
direct capital outflow generated by resident companies has
significantly increased. There is a similar process concerning
portfolio equity investments: Hungarian institutional
investors are tending to buy foreign shares in increasing
volumes, therefore the outflow of equity capital does in effect
reduce net non-debt-creating financing.
Direct capital outflow from Hungary is also extremely high
in comparison with neighbouring countries (Table 2). As far
as the GDP-proportional FDI inflow is concerned, Hungary
used to be number one in the region until the end of the
1990s, and then usually performed in a middle-rank position.
This was largely due to the fact that privatisation in
neighbouring countries was started much later.
9 At the same
time, direct capital outflow usually exceeded the level
characterising the region, and this difference has further
increased in recent years (for more details on capital outflow,
see the box below).
In 2007, the role of debt-creating financing accelerated to an
outstanding level, which was fundamentally due to one-off
factors. At the annual level, we saw more than EUR 3 billion
in outflows of net non-debt-creating resources, which led to
a 6.5 percentage point rise in net external debt. This capital
outflow was greatly facilitated by the following two specific
factors which have little to do with the macroeconomic
environment:
• MOL attempted to protect itself against OMV’s take-over
efforts by purchasing its own shares in a value of over EUR
2 billion. The majority of the company’s shares traded on
the stock exchange was in the hands of foreign
shareholders, hence the transaction showed up as non-
debt-creating capital withdrawal in the Balance of
Payments.
• There was a change in the ownership of the foreign-owned
Budapest Airport and parallel to that a change in its
financing structure. The previous owner financed the
acquisition of the company 100 per cent from FDI, while
the new owner financed the larger part of the EUR 1.9
billion sale price from foreign bank loans, and not from
FDI. As a result of the above transaction, there was a
THE STRUCTURE OF EXTERNAL FINANCING: IS THERE A REASON TO WORRY ABOUT...
MNB BULLETIN • APRIL 2008 17
9The last larger wave of privatisation in Hungary (MOL, Budapest Airport) increased the volume of non-debt-creating financing for 2004–2005.
10 It is obvious even from public data that the banking sector plays an important role in FDI outflow. In the period 2003–2007, more than 30 per cent of FDI outflow was
the result of commercial bank activities.
11 In recent years, the structure of households’ assets has been constantly changing in favour of investment units and insurance technical reserves (life insurance,
pension fund savings).
12The equity exposure of funds (private and voluntary pension funds, health funds) rose from 14 per cent in the beginning of 2005 to 29 per cent by the end of 2007,
while their managed wealth increased by more than 80 per cent. Simultaneously, the proportion of the previously dominant Hungarian shares in the portfolio
steadily fell to account for a mere 36 per cent by end–2007.
13 Income revenue in connection with residents’non-debt-creating foreign investments was on a rising trend already in the last few years.
Concerns about Hungary’s competitiveness together with the general
macro-economic uncertainty may have contributed to the accelerated
outflow of non-debt-creating capital in recent years; it seems, however,
that so far other motivations account for the larger share of the capital
export which has been seen.
The major part of FDIoutflow we have so far witnessed is attributable to
a few large resident companies that are performing well on the
domestic markets (e.g. MOL, OTP, MKB).
10 For these companies, the
domestic market seems saturated, and therefore their capital export is
motivated by regional expansion and acquisition opportunities which
enable them to tap into new markets.
The rise in capital outflow in the form of portfolio equities reflects the
growing international activity of domestic institutional investors. Non-
bank saving alternatives are increasingly popular among households,
and legislative changes have also supported the development of the
sector.
11 On the one hand, a large volume of savings has been
channelled into various funds, while on the other hand, complete
foreign exchange liberalisation made the purchase of foreign shares
possible without any constraints. The introduction of the ‘elective
portfolio system’for private pension funds has also contributed to a rise
in capital export, since funds are forced to increase the ratio of shares in
their portfolio in order to satisfy legal regulations.
12
At the same time, non-debt-creating capital export may have positive
effects over the long run. Through foreign direct investment, the
domestic companies may expand further and institutional investors
may diversify their portfolios by buying foreign shares. Non-debt-
creating capital outflow may thus contribute to reducing the deficit in
the balance of income and hence to the growth of disposable income in
the whole economy.
13
The reasons behind and long-term impacts of non-debt-creating capital outflowsignificant FDI outflow and an equal amount of debt-
creating inflow recorded in the Balance of Payments
Statistics.
The strong 2007 increase in Hungary’s net external debt
ratio is regarded as an unfavourable development by
investors. Looking behind the aggregate indicators, it can be
concluded that (i) the fall in the ratio of non-debt-creating
financing is primarily a result of the increased outflow of
such resources, while (ii) the inflow of FDI is around the
average in regional comparison, furthermore (iii) in 2007
one-off factors resulted in a temporary acceleration in the
spread of debt-creating financing.
NON-DEBT-CREATING FINANCING 
– QUESTIONABLE ADVANTAGES
The causes behind non-debt-creating capital outflow are
likely to persist, and hence it is reasonable to expect a long-
term shift towards debt-type resources in the structure of
external financing even if we eliminate the one-off effects.
This phenomenon may have a temporarily negative impact
on investor sentiment, since investment banks and credit
rating agencies tend to consider the ratio of external
financing requirement covered by FDI or, more generally, by
non-debt instruments a sort of vulnerability indicator.
However, the favourable properties associated with non-
debt-creating foreign investment have been both theoretically
and empirically challenged. In the following, we will examine
the arguments most often cited in support of non-debt-
creating resources with a critical eye. It is the aim of this
section to demonstrate that most of these arguments are
presented and embedded in public thought rather one-
sidedly, even though, in the light of recent research, they are
no longer held to be generally and widely valid.
1. Non-debt-creating external resources are connected to the
investment expenditures of the corporate sector, hence they
contribute to future growth.
The rise in external financing requirement is generally better
received when it is associated primarily with an increase in
investment rather than with a fall in domestic savings. If the
stronger demand for external financing is closely related to
increased corporate capital formation, it may improve future
growth prospects and thus entail more moderate risks. If
however, the rise in external financing requirement is a result
of low household savings and fast consumption growth, or an
increase in general government deficit, it is believed that
external financing is less likely to contribute to future
growth.
Non-debt-creating resources – particularly in the form of FDI
– are often thought to be associated with corporate
investment expenditure, although this is not necessarily the
case. It is a fact that the general government and households
(through the banking system) typically rely on debt-creating
foreign financing, whereas corporations are capable of raising
non-debt-creating resources by issuing shares or using FDI to
satisfy their financial needs. However, there is no direct
relationship between the form of financing and the purpose
of the funds, hence non-debt-creating external financing does
not necessarily go hand in hand with enhanced investment
activities. This correlation seems rather weak in Hungary in
particular (Chart 2).
2. Non-debt-creating resources – particularly FDI – are stable
forms of financing and hence reduce the risk of a balance of
payments crisis.
Foreign direct investment is traditionally regarded as a less
liquid and therefore more stable form of financing than debt-
type investments. According to common belief, it follows
from this that these types of financing reduce the risk of a
balance of payments crisis. Levchenko and Mauro (2006), for
example, used simple descriptive statistics to demonstrate
that under normal circumstances the volatility and
persistence of the various forms of capital flows are not very
different, but in ‘sudden stop’ periods, non-debt-creating
resources – and particularly FDI – prove to be considerably
stable. According to their conclusion, debt-type portfolio
investments and, even more so, bank and commercial loans
are held ‘responsible’ for the development of ‘sudden stops’.
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Chart 2
FDI inflow and investments*
*  Net inflow of FDI excluding privatisation revenues (MNB) and the
investments of the economic entities operating as ‘enterprises’ (CSO). 
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Per cent Per centMany studies, however, challenge the view that there is a
point in separately examining the various forms of financing
in terms of the volatility and predictability of the total
external capital inflow. Companies may, at their own
discretion, reshuffle the structure of their liabilities, therefore
in the event of a crisis, capital outflow does not necessarily
mean an exodus of FDI. If, for example, a foreign company
would like to remove capital from a given country in fear of
a crisis, it has the option not only to remove its own equity,
but also to use domestic loans to purchase foreign assets, or
to pay back foreign loans. In this case, ‘whatever comes in
through the door, leaves through the window in a different
form’, therefore the volatility of FDI in itself provides little
information about the volatility of the entire financial
account (Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann, 2000).
3. Non-debt-creating liabilities promote international risk
sharing.
One favourable characteristic of non-debt-creating financing
is that it may play a potentially greater role in international
risk sharing than debt-creating funds. This stems from the
fact that returns realised on equity are generally pro-cyclical,
i.e. foreign investors are entitled to lower income when the
domestic economy is facing difficulties, and to higher income
in times of boom. Similarly, when due to a negative shock the
exchange rate is depreciating, the foreign currency
denominated external debt service rises, while FDI and stock
yields presumably fall. In this sense, non-debt-creating
liabilities can contribute to smoothing the country’s
disposable income.
The advantages of this potential risk sharing are strongly
weakened by the fact that foreign owners may react to
slowing domestic economy by reducing the share of
reinvested incomes.
14 The total income generated by foreign-
owned companies may in fact change according to the
current general economic situation, but it is exclusively the
owners’ decision how much they choose to reinvest in the
company and how much they take out from the country in
the form of dividends, for example.
4. Non-debt-creating liabilities do not involve maturity and
currency mismatches.
Theoretically, equity-type liabilities do not involve maturity
or exchange rate risks since the owners’ claim is the very cash
flow – be it denominated in any currency – that is left over
after paying out all the other eligible parties (creditors).
Ideally, a company is capable of borrowing both short- or
long-term in any currency and hence can adjust its liabilities
to the maturity structure of its assets and the denomination
of its cash flows. When this is not possible however – i.e. the
market is not complete – the company’s balance sheet will
contain maturity and currency mismatches. In such a
situation, a greater role of non-debt-creating financing is
justifiable in the optimal financing structure of the company.
In this case, however, it would be a mistake to interpret the
high share of non-debt-creating financing as a sign of
economic stability, because this is probably a mere reflection
of the investors’ optimal reaction to the mismatches evident
in the country’s balance sheet. Empirical studies have, for
example, indicated that countries suffering from ‘original sin’
– those that are unable to borrow in their own currencies –
rely much more on FDI to satisfy their external financing
needs (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2000).
5. Non-debt-generating financing – particularly FDI –
contributes to economic growth through positive externalities.
Arguments in support of foreign direct investment very often
state that FDI can accelerate growth and economic
convergence in the host country. According to the
traditionally accepted explanation, it is the associated
positive externalities that make FDI different from
investments carried out by domestic companies. Foreign-
owned companies may bring with them new technology,
know-how, managerial skills, and access to new markets
which, when passing through into the recipient country may
expand the production-possibility frontier.
It is important to recognise, that the above mentioned
advantages attributed to FDI are, in fact, linked to the
companies themselves rather than the manner of financing.
When a foreign-owned company provides the host country
with new technology, better management systems, or access
to new export markets, then this is solely due to the
company’s activities and has nothing to do with direct
capital. Direct capital is only one of the possible ways to
finance a company – a macro-accounting concept – and has
no external impact itself. The positive impact that foreign
investments have on domestic economic growth – if it exists
at all – cannot be restricted only to external financing in the
form of FDI.
A large part of the empirical literature either finds no
detectable relationship between FDI and growth in the host
country, or the relationship seems to be evident only in
countries with low levels of economic development
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14 When calculating gross national domestic income (GNDI), the reinvested incomes of foreign companies are also deducted as they are not linked to resident property.
Still, it is considered more advantageous if foreigners reinvest a larger share of their profits realised in Hungary into their enterprises, as this amount reduces the
country’s need for ‘new’or ‘additional’external resources.(Mileva, 2008; Herzer, Klasen and Nowak-Lehmann,
2008). These findings are consistent with the observation
that in countries with relatively underdeveloped financial
markets and weak institutions, foreign-owned companies
tend to rely on FDI. For this very reason, in order to draw
any far-reaching conclusions regarding the structure of
external financing, it must be understood what factors
foreign investors consider when choosing the form of
financing. Economic theory may provide us with a starting
point for this endeavour.
THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES RELATING
TO THE STRUCTURE OF EXTERNAL
FINANCING
Although there is no widely accepted theory for explaining
the external capital structure of firms, the vast majority of the
literature sets out from the microeconomic models of
corporate finance. The classic study by Modigliani and Miller
(1958) demonstrated that in an environment of perfect
information, and in the absence of bankruptcy costs and
distorting taxes, the value of a firm is unaffected by how it is
financed. The majority of subsequent analyses attributed the
empirical failure of the ‘irrelevance theorem’ to the
asymmetric information of actors. If, for example, external
investors are less informed concerning the internal operations
of a company, the market will underprice newly issued
shares, and therefore raising funds through equity is more
expensive for the firm than using internal funds. This train of
thought takes us to a certain kind of hierarchy of the different
types of financing, in other words, firms rank financial
instruments in accordance with the extent of information
asymmetry and the related mispricing.
The fundamental principles laid down in the literature of
corporate finance are very useful in examining the external
financing of countries, although other types of imperfections
may also become decisive from a macroeconomic
perspective. It follows from the analysis of the impacts of
information asymmetry presented above, that share-buying
investors require a higher return for accepting higher
uncertainty (risks) than creditors do. This micro-level
correlation stands true for the investments of foreigners as
well (Chart 3).
At the macro level, however, the relevant question is how
much of the country’s external financing needs the foreign
investors are willing to finance through debt, and how much
through direct ownership. This decision is, however, very
much influenced by factors that relate back to the
fundamental differences between a firm and a country. On
the one hand, the information asymmetry between residents
and foreigners may be significant for obvious reasons
(geographical distance, language, knowledge of the
institutional system, etc.), while on the other hand, after the
realisation of the foreign investment a sovereign state cannot
always be forced by legal means to ensure the original
conditions agreed on.
According to the first approach, foreign investors will favour
financing forms that will help remedy their information
disadvantages compared to residents, and also the mitigation
of information frictions associated with a particular type of
asset may increase its role in external financing. Neumann
(2003), for example, presumes that equity-type claims (FDI,
shares) also transmit a certain degree of control rights and
thus convey some information about an investment. If
ownership does indeed help reduce the costs of monitoring
necessary due to information asymmetry, then non-debt-
creating financing is a more favourable way of financing than
debt, which transmits less information. Using the same logic,
it follows that the more transparent and developed a
country’s capital market is – i.e. the smaller the information
asymmetry between residents and foreigners, which may only
be bridged by direct ownership – the greater the role played
by debt in external financing.
The second approach focuses on the possibility of
expropriation and the problem of imperfect enforceability of
international contracts. A major difference between a country
and a company is that governments may at any time
expropriate the assets of the private sector, or refuse to repay
their sovereign debts. When such measures are pursued, the
claims of foreigners and residents are usually treated
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Chart 3
Implicit yield paid on Hungary’s external resources*
Source: MNB calculation.
* The implicit yield is calculated as the quotient of expenditure in the
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Per centdifferently – normally to the detriment of foreigners.
15 For
this reason, foreign investors will prefer financing forms that
are more difficult to expropriate either directly or indirectly.
According to Albuquerque (2003), the vast share of FDI is
intangible (technology, brand names), and is thus more
difficult to expropriate. It follows from this, again, that
countries with less developed legal and institutional
structures – where the possibility of yields being expropriated
is higher – can only finance themselves through direct
investment, whereas in countries with developed capital
markets, the ratio of debt-type financing – which in theory
may be easier to expropriate – may be higher.
The above models suggest that the significant role played by
non-debt-creating foreign investments (and particularly FDI)
is not necessarily a sign of investors’ confidence in the host
country, but – quite on the contrary – may be a reflection of
high risk and uncertainty associated with the legal system, or
the weakness of the institutional system. Of course, such
‘soft’ hypotheses are difficult to test based on aggregate
macro-economic data, but there is some evidence that the
above relationships are, by and large, valid. Using various
development and risk indicators, and institutional quality
indices, many studies have succeeded in demonstrating that a
more predictable economic environment and a higher level of
development usually go hand in hand with a higher share of
debt-type foreign investment (Albuquerque, 2003; Faria and
Mauro, 2004; Faria, Lane, Mauro and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007;
Daude and Fratzscher, 2006).
Looking at a wide range of European countries relying on
external financing, it is striking that in many relatively
developed countries debt-creating liabilities account for a
large share of total net external liabilities (Chart 4).
16 Every
country’s international investment position is naturally
affected by a number of other factors – often rooted in the
country’s history
17 – but the data are still broadly consistent
with the conclusions of the theory. Taking into consideration
the significant scattering of the values, we can certainly
conclude that the share of Hungary’s external debt in total
foreign liabilities is not far off from countries with a similar
level of development.
With regard to sustainability, therefore, it is not the structure
of financing that is primarily decisive but the level of foreign
liabilities. On the basis of the above, when evaluating
different countries’ dependency on external financing, it does
not take us very far if we only focus on some selected types
of foreign liabilities, as the country’s total international
investment position and its dynamics ought to be examined.
While owing to the decreasing external financing
requirement, Hungary’s net external liabilities to GDP
stabilised in 2007, the ratio is still extremely high by
international standards (Chart 5). In the event of a renewed
rise in external imbalance, the high starting base could have
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Chart 4
Ratio of debt-creating liabilities in net external
liabilities
(31 December 2006)
Source: Eurostat, International Financial Statistics (IMF). The sample
includes those countries of the EU27 and countries presently negotiating
accession whose net external liabilities are positive, together with the USA
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Chart 5
Net external liabilities in international comparison
(2006, as a percentage of GDP)
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15 Schnitzer (2002) points out that the host country’s sovereign government may exercise negative impacts on the yields of foreign investments by means other than
nationalisation as well. These may include changes in the tax system or the introduction of special import or export customs (‘creeping expropriation’).
16 A similar conclusion may be drawn on the basis of the external debt-to-GDP data.
17 It is a widely shared opinion that Ireland’s impressive inflow of FDI was also due to the fact that there was a live relationship between Ireland and the management




A PROBLEM FOR HUNGARY?
In 2007, Hungary’s external debt-to-GDP ratio increased
significantly, which in a period of fading global risk appetite
drew attention to the gradually increasing role of debt-
creating external financing.
In evaluating recent processes one must take into account the
role of one-off factors and the fact that FDI inflow cannot be
considered low compared to other countries in the region. In
2007, two one-off transactions related to MOL and Budapest
Airport dramatically decreased the net non-debt-creating
inflow of capital (by about 4 per cent of GDP). Meanwhile,
FDI inflow which is considered a very important index by
many analysts did not increase in any of the countries of the
region, and there was a slight decline in most of them.
Over the long run it is worth taking into account natural
reshuffling in the financing structure and the potential
advantages of capital export. The rise in the capital export of
domestic companies and institutional investors’ increasing
foreign share purchases indicates that the structure of
external financing is likely to shift towards debt-creating
resources in the long run. Although this may be temporarily
disadvantageous with regard to investor sentiment, it does
not necessarily represent a problem in terms of long-term
sustainability and, furthermore, in some respects, it may be
considered a natural part of the convergence process.
With the termination of privatisation and progress in
economic transition, the drop in FDI inflow is partly a
natural phenomenon. It is an empirically demonstrable trend
that with the deepening of financial intermediation,
economic development and the improvement of the
institutional system, the structure of external financing of a
country shifts towards debt-creating liabilities over the long
term. Development of the domestic financial markets and the
institutional system require foreign investors less and less to
invest their capital in the country through direct ownership.
Increasing non-debt-creating capital outflow may, over the
long run, contribute to the improvement of the balance of
income and thus increase the gross national disposable
income (GNDI) in the entire economy. Parallel to falling
non-debt-creating capital inflow, as has seen recently,
Hungary may become a jump-off point for FDI towards less
developed countries (e.g. Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria), and
institutional investors may diversify their portfolios by
buying foreign shares. Equity-type investments can generate a
greater income over the long run than debt liabilities, and
hence we can expect a greater inflow in the balance of
income than seen currently.
Accordingly, in the event of a permanent decrease in the
budget deficit and concurrently in the external financing
requirement, the rise in the share of debt-creating financing
itself should not be considered detrimental. It is, however,
important to point out that, independently from the structure
of financing, the level of Hungary’s net external liabilities is
extremely high, which continues to present a serious risk to
sustainability.
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